At
the end of the winter 1941–42 campaign, the Soviets had made better
progress in the center than in the South. The Germans were aware that
the Soviets were leery of a second try at Moscow, and that they had
accordingly massed their forces in front of Moscow.
Because
the OKH was trying the best they could with what they had. Contrary to
popular opinion, Hitler did not frequently interfere in operational
decisions. He usually picked an option out of many, but those options
themselves came from the General Staff. And if the option turned out to
be the right one, Hitler would take credit for it, like the push through
the Ardennes in 1940.
Now, as to why the OKH
would swing south towards eastern Ukraine and the Caucuses in 1942, it’s
because they had underestimated the strength of the Red Army. They
didn’t know then by how hilariously off the mark they were, but they did
realize that the Red Army was still alive and kicking.
The whole premise of Operation Barbarossa was as follows:
- Rapid movement into Russia while the enemy was still shocked and disoriented thereby not giving them enough time to regroup and mount a coherent defense
- Eliminate the Red Army as a field force through gigantic encirclements
- Capture the 3 hearts of the Soviet Union - the ideological heart in Leningrad, political in Moscow and economic in the Ukraine
It
was assumed that once these objectives were met, Russia would collapse.
However, the entire plan predicated itself upon strength estimates by
German Intelligence.
In general, intelligence
failures happen all the time. Nothing wrong with that. The Allies didn’t
see the Battle of the Bulge coming, for example. But the Germans,
either through colossal pig-headedness or just floundering incompetence,
got the intelligence and counter-intelligence aspects of warfare
spectacularly wrong. The entire intelligence structure was infiltrated
by the Poles before 1939 who then famously cracked the enigma code. They
then failed to correctly estimate the fighter strength of the RAF
during the Battle of Britain, and then they almost completely missed the
existence of the entire Red Army. The Soviets had men and materiel that
were orders of magnitude above German estimates.
Hitler
and the General Staff were not complete idiots though. They knew very
well that the Soviet Union was a completely different beast from France,
and Napoleon’s failure in 1812 hovered over their heads constantly. The
lesson they learnt from the 1812 calamity was that taking land in
Russia was meaningless. It made no impact on the enemy fighting
capacity, and would only tie them down. Beelining for Moscow while the
Red Army still could mount credible assaults would be the height of
folly. So, the plan was that by the time Army Group Center were at the
gates of Moscow, the Red Army should’ve been eliminated almost
completely. Which is where those gigantic encirclements would come in
handy. And sure enough, they inflicted massive casualties on the
Russians, around 4 million, to be specific.
Situation on the Eastern Front just before the Battle of Moscow
Now
that they got that out of they way, they were now poised to take
Moscow. Only that, they really weren’t. If the Red Army had been only as
large as estimated by Germany, yes, 4 million casualties would’ve
permanently crippled the Red Army into non-existence. But they weren’t
even close to being done with the Red Army. Fresh divisions from Siberia
were carted in to defend Moscow. Not only were the Germans stopped,
they were pushed back in a giant counterattack. Since 1939, the German
army had been phoning it in with minimal casualties. And now, they lost a
million men. This came as a rude shock to the German High Command and
taking Moscow was shelved for the time being, to be revisited, once the
Red Army had been destroyed.
Now, another
opportunity presented itself. If the Germans could deny the Soviets use
of the farmlands of the Ukraine and the oil from the Caucuses, their
armed forces would grind to a halt. No need for hunting down and
encircling the endless Soviet divisions, just deny them the supplies to
operate. So, a push in the south was planned.
Oil
came from the Caucuses and was shipped across the Caspian Sea, and up
the Volga to Stalingrad. From Stalingrad, it would move by rail to
Moscow which was the railway hub. If Stalingrad were taken, the oil
shipments would cease. And so began the end of the Third Reich at
Stalingrad.
The
stretch of terrain between Moscow and Leningrad is rich in dense woods,
marshes, light woods, rivers, and thin in roads and population and
railroads running East to West. Attacking there was just a non-starter
once it became clear that the Soviets had hacked out a nice fat buffer
zone during the winter and had the means to reinforce in that sector
along the Moscow-Leningrad railroad if they needed to.
So there won’t be any pocketing Moscow by getting around it behind on both sides.
How
about swinging around South of it and coming up behind? Two problems
with that. First, the Soviets are strong on that sector and they’re
expecting you. Second, there’s the Oka river, which shields the
approaches to Moscow from the South.
Direct Frontal Assault? No. That’s not going to work.
So
what are the Germans supposed to do for 1942? They can’t get to Moscow
unless and until they’ve badly lamed the Soviet Union on some other
battlefield.
And then the Soviets play right
into German hands by mounting a reckless attack to liberate Kharkov, in
May 1942. The Germans ambushed that, cut in behind it, and destroyed the
attacking Soviet armored forces. Big haul of prisoners, few German
casualties, the same old story of summer 1941. So now the Soviets were
weaker than ever in the South. Off we go, toward Stalingrad and the
Caucasus. First stage, an attack from the Kharkov vicinity towards
Voronezh. The Soviets are already understrength there, and it will look
as though it’s exactly the uppercut toward Moscow that they’re
expecting. Nice to take Voronezh, but not essential. Next, roll South,
forming a flank along the Don river from Voronezh south, and peeling off
Romanians and Hungarians and Italians to guard that easy river flank.
Other forces attack due East from near Rostov, and pocket a bunch of
Russians. Then, head South some more. Take Rostov and blast on into the
Caucasus. Soviets will be wrong-footed. Roll right on into Stalingrad,
bastion there and anchor, and then concentrate on the Caucasus.
It
sounded good to the Germans. And it worked, to a point, at first. So
there’s an explanation of why they did it. As to why it didn’t work in
the long run, well, that’s another story. But the key ingredient of that
story is “long run”. It is just a very long ways from Kharkov to
Stalingrad, and much further yet to Baku, the largest, though not the
only, source of oil for the Soviet Union at the time.
Hitler’s armies were shoved back from the gates of Moscow in December of 1941 and the Germans literally could not take Moscow based on logistic, weather, supply, manpower and other problems compared to the Red Army at that time. Hitler and his top generals never agreed on taking Moscow as a priority until Operation Barbarossa had been fought for several months. Stalingrad seems to have been an afterthought, taken the next year, when Hitler went after resources instead of strict military objectives. Hitler never took 100% of Stalingrad. The German 6th Army was cut off and forced to surrender with a greatly reduced force. Both objectives, Moscow and Stalingrad, were too much for Hitler to take given the vast distances, supply and repair problems, terrible Russian roads, dust, mud, snow, manpower shortages, smaller German economy, sub-zero weather and ferocious resistance of the Red Army, aided by the Allies.
Hitler at all times before, during and after Operation Barbarossa was overly optimistic compared to the facts.
It was then glorious city the embellishment of Russia, a real prize, a populated city, a stronghold.
Because
the OKH was trying the best they could with what they had. Contrary to
popular opinion, Hitler did not frequently interfere in operational
decisions. He usually picked an option out of many, but those options
themselves came from the General Staff. And if the option turned out to
be the right one, Hitler would take credit for it, like the push through
the Ardennes in 1940.
Now, as to why the OKH
would swing south towards eastern Ukraine and the Caucuses in 1942, it’s
because they had underestimated the strength of the Red Army. They
didn’t know then by how hilariously off the mark they were, but they did
realize that the Red Army was still alive and kicking.
The whole premise of Operation Barbarossa was as follows:
- Rapid movement into Russia while the enemy was still shocked and disoriented thereby not giving them enough time to regroup and mount a coherent defense
- Eliminate the Red Army as a field force through gigantic encirclements
- Capture the 3 hearts of the Soviet Union - the ideological heart in Leningrad, political in Moscow and economic in the Ukraine
It
was assumed that once these objectives were met, Russia would collapse.
However, the entire plan predicated itself upon strength estimates by
German Intelligence.
In general, intelligence
failures happen all the time. Nothing wrong with that. The Allies didn’t
see the Battle of the Bulge coming, for example. But the Germans,
either through colossal pig-headedness or just floundering incompetence,
got the intelligence and counter-intelligence aspects of warfare
spectacularly wrong. The entire intelligence structure was infiltrated
by the Poles before 1939 who then famously cracked the enigma code. They
then failed to correctly estimate the fighter strength of the RAF
during the Battle of Britain, and then they almost completely missed the
existence of the entire Red Army. The Soviets had men and materiel that
were orders of magnitude above German estimates.
Hitler
and the General Staff were not complete idiots though. They knew very
well that the Soviet Union was a completely different beast from France,
and Napoleon’s failure in 1812 hovered over their heads constantly. The
lesson they learnt from the 1812 calamity was that taking land in
Russia was meaningless. It made no impact on the enemy fighting
capacity, and would only tie them down. Beelining for Moscow while the
Red Army still could mount credible assaults would be the height of
folly. So, the plan was that by the time Army Group Center were at the
gates of Moscow, the Red Army should’ve been eliminated almost
completely. Which is where those gigantic encirclements would come in
handy. And sure enough, they inflicted massive casualties on the
Russians, around 4 million, to be specific.
Situation on the Eastern Front just before the Battle of Moscow
Now that they got that out of they way, they were now poised to take Moscow. Only that, they really weren’t. If the Red Army had been only as large as estimated by Germany, yes, 4 million casualties would’ve permanently crippled the Red Army into non-existence. But they weren’t even close to being done with the Red Army. Fresh divisions from Siberia were carted in to defend Moscow. Not only were the Germans stopped, they were pushed back in a giant counterattack. Since 1939, the German army had been phoning it in with minimal casualties. And now, they lost a million men. This came as a rude shock to the German High Command and taking Moscow was shelved for the time being, to be revisited, once the Red Army had been destroyed.
Now, another opportunity presented itself. If the Germans could deny the Soviets use of the farmlands of the Ukraine and the oil from the Caucuses, their armed forces would grind to a halt. No need for hunting down and encircling the endless Soviet divisions, just deny them the supplies to operate. So, a push in the south was planned.
Oil came from the Caucuses and was shipped across the Caspian Sea, and up the Volga to Stalingrad. From Stalingrad, it would move by rail to Moscow which was the railway hub. If Stalingrad were taken, the oil shipments would cease. And so began the end of the Third Reich at Stalingrad.
