Can satellites be hacked? Are Satellites the Next Cybersecurity Battleground?
byAlyssa Melono
So many of the mundane, earthly things we rely
on, from GPS to making a credit card transaction, are made possible by
satellites orbiting beyond that blue sky, thousands of miles outside of
Earth.
Space may feel like an untouchable realm, but
as the systems we have in place get older, they're becoming even more
vulnerable to cybersecurity threats, according to experts.
Galileo & Magellan Satellites And Planet Earth. Education Images / UIG via Getty Images
It's something that needs to be addressed,
said Jeff Matthews, director of venture strategy and research at the
Space Frontier Foundation, a space advocacy nonprofit.
Related: The New Race to Build a Space-Based Internet "Space allows for some very unique
business-use cases and opportunities, and when done right, can really go
a long way to protecting communication interests and national
infrastructure," Matthews told NBC News. "[However,] we have to be very aware about the information security side up in space and down here."
A recent report from Chatham House,
an international affairs think tank, said, "the intersection of space
security and cybersecurity is not a new problem, but it has remained
largely unrecognized as a potentially significant vulnerability."
Old Systems Face New Threats Since its introduction into the mainstream
more than three decades ago, GPS has now made its way into almost
everything, from our phones to our cars and watches.
Americans were given access to global
positioning in 1983, after Korean Air Lines Flight 007, traveling to
Seoul from New York City, strayed into Soviet airspace and was shot
down, killing all 269 people on board. The tragedy prompted President
Reagan to speed up his plan for civilian use of GPS. "If the GPS constellation went down, things
would stop flying, maps would stop working," Jim Cantrell, one of the
founding members of SpaceX and now CEO of Vector Space Systems, told NBC
News.
There are a myriad of uses for the satellites
in space, from intelligence to communication, navigation and completing
capital transactions, such as when you swipe your credit card at the gas
pump.
"Disruption to that, even on a small scale, can have a wide-reaching impact," said Matthews.
What Are the Threats?
David
Livingstone, one of the authors of the Chatham House report, told NGB
News hackers could pull off a cyberattack by taking remote control of a
satellite or by spoofing or jamming its signals.
"There is growing
vulnerability although there is also growing diversity," Livingstone
said. "The cyber threats, whether nation states or organized gangs or
terrorists or individual hackers, they are all out there growing even
more sophisticated."
Two of the cyber attacks Livingstone
mentioned are spoofing and jamming. With spoofing, a hacker can send out
fake signals to disguise their activity. Jamming is designed to flood a
server with so much traffic it causes an interruption. So could that 400-pound hacker sitting on his bed — to paraphrase Donald Trump — have the capability to hack a system in space?
"I
doubt you would see a lone wolf," Matthews said. "It would have to be a
really coordinated attack. I think the low hanging fruit for hackers
will be the cube satellites."
The US National Oceanographic and
Atmospheric Administration took its Satellite Data Information System
offline in September 2017 after an apparent hacking incident, which kept
weather agencies around the world from receiving necessary forecasting
data for 48 hours, according to the report.
While there are risks
with older infrastructure, Livingstone said sees real cybersecurity
threats with "the commoditization of space."
Looking to the Future
Protecting the security of the existing infrastructure is one part of the problem. "It's becoming ubiquitous, and so the question is how do we protect it?" Cantrell asked.
China
may have one forward-looking solution. The country launched what is
said to be world's first quantum communications satellite into orbit in
August. While many cybersecurity experts adhere to the belief that
everything is hackable, a satellite using quantum communications could
be pretty close to tamper-proof, thanks to physics.
Quantum
entanglement is sort of like sending a message in a soap bubble. If the
wrong person pops it, the message will go away, Gregoir Ribordy,
co-founder of quantum cryptography firm ID Quantique, told the Wall Street Journal.
Quantum satellites are one viable option for the future, according to Matthews. However,
in the Chatham House report, Livingstone urged the creation of an
"international space and cybersecurity regime" comprised of a "limited
number of able states and other critical stakeholders," such as those in
the space supply chain and insurance industries.
The proposed
independent group would be tasked with fostering relationships between
key members of the space cyber community, and "provide a vehicle for
practical leadership in delivering enhanced security within the whole of
the global space sector," the report said.
Getting to Space Is Becoming Easier
Getting
to space historically hasn't been easy, but a number of private
companies are now making it more cost effective and accessible for those
seeking to bring a part of their business out of this world.
And,
with new opportunities come new challenges for protecting cyber
security in the private sector, such as Cantrell's Vector Space Systems'
Galactic Sky program, which helps start-ups leverage the utility of
micro satellites through software.
"It is going to be different,
but one of the attractions of what we are doing and what makes it more
secure is we have known and limited access points," he said. "It is a
lot harder to get into the system."
Matthews, of the Space
Frontier Foundation, said he wants to see more of a focus being put on
cyber security in space and on the ground — whether it's for our older
infrastructure or the newer satellites.
"We are on the potential for a revolution to drive space-based security," he said.
Are Satellites Vulnerable to Hackers?
Strictly speaking, having someone attack your satellite would fall under denial of service[1] for most such attacks; however, it could be so damaging that we want to focus on these particular attacks in this paper. Ministry of Defence Satellite
In 1999, the Telegraph carried the following story, "A group of
computer hackers suspected of seizing control of a British military
communications satellite using a home computer, triggering a "frenetic"
security alert, has been traced to the south of England. A
security source said that, up to a month ago, the hackers found a "cute
way" into the control system for one of the Ministry of Defence's Skynet
satellites and "changed the characteristics of channels used to convey
military communications, satellite television and telephone calls".[2]
We were unable to find an additional source for this story, so it may
not be valid, but this UK Government document does explain more about the UK space network.[3]
The MoD story certainly gets your attention. However, the question a
wise security manager asks is, can it be done, outside of a James Bond
or Mission Impossible scenario? Is it possible to hack a satellite? If
you mean use the satellite for your own signals, the answer is most
certainly, yes. "Simply put, satellites are relay stations suspended
36,000 km (22,000 miles) up above the equator. At this altitude,
satellites appear to be fixed in relation to earth, therefore the name
geostationary satellites."[4] They use their fuel to maintain their
position and so fuel is the primary determinant in the lifespan of a
satellite. "Here's how it is possible to ride over a satellite with an unauthorized uplink:
An uplink earth station transmits the desired signal to satellite.
The satellite receives and processes the incoming signal by changing the frequency and amplifying it.
The satellite transmits the signal back to earth, typically covering large geographical areas.
Earth station(s) on earth receive the signal."[5]
So in this sense, this is "just radio signals being repeated." Ever see the 1980 movie Used Cars?
They use a microwave transmitter to take over the feed of a TV
station--use a slightly different frequency and be closer to the
receiver, and it's easy to do. Not much harder to steal satellite space:
find an appropriate transmitter, upconverter and a few other things,
and a satellite dish (and, know a bit about it.) (Lots of used satellite
uplink equipment is out there.)
A communications satellite is
simply a radio repeater. Most have 12 or 24 different "transponders"
that use a certain frequency block. For C band, the earth station uplink
operates in the 6 Ghz range. The satellite receives the signal, changes
it to a 4 Ghz frequency, and sends it back to earth. Most satellites
don't care what is modulated on the carrier. They just translate it and
send it back out. (They could be designed to require security on the
carrier for the satellite to repeat it, but I don't think many have been
built with that. Most of the interest has been in encoding the
video/audio/data itself to prevent unauthorized far-end decoding.)
Each transponder has a certain amount of bandwidth and power. Either
one is the limit that can't be exceeded. In the early days, one entire
transponder was used for one analog TV signal. Although, even then,
Alaska used a bit of left over space to put up pubic radio audio-only
signals.
Today, with most video and MPEG of one flavor or
another you can get good quality using only part of a transponder, so
you can have multiple signals--either multiplexed together onto one
carrier (most efficient), or coming up on separate carriers. In that
case, the center frequency of each carrier and its power level is chosen
so as to not exceed available bandwidth and power for a transponder.
(You also have to worry about intermodulation between carriers creating
interfering carriers that also use up power.) The National
Telecommunications University was one of the first to use multiple
digitally encoded video signals on different carriers all on one
transponder. When they first tried it, they had the carriers all nicely
spaced out--and it didn't work.
If a transponder isn't "full"
and has unused bandwidth and power, a person could easily identify an
"empty" place on the transponder using a spectrum analyzer hooked up to a
satellite receive dish. You can buy software to turn a computer into a spectrum analyzer for a few hundred dollars.
Figure out how much power and bandwidth you can use without messing up
anyone else's signal and use most any satellite uplink (check eBay) to
create the carrier. What kind of encoding you use really just determines
what kind of receivers your end users need. (Again, check eBay for
complete systems, including receivers, to send out.)
Like any
good Trojan or Zombie, the key is to not be noticed. If you aren't
messing up anyone else's feed, and aren't putting a big extra drain on
the satellite, chances are no one is going to notice right away. Even
when they do, finding your uplink can be difficult."[6]
Double Illumination
An attacker could create a denial of service condition where two or
more carriers are on the same frequency at the same time. The carriers
may be from the same or different uplinks. The audible effect of double
illumination can range from almost no audible change to complete
impairment depending on carrier power and other factors.[7] Double
illumination is the main reason for the ID legal uplinks have. Someone
accidentally turns on an uplink into the wrong satellite space, often
when tuning or moving a dish, wiping out other services. But if has been
a significant impact accidentally, it could certainly be used on
purpose. Tamil Rebels Hijack US Satellite Signal 2007
In 2007, this discussion moved from theoretical to reality. Rebel
independence fighters in Sri Lanka have been pirating the services of a
US satellite to send radio and television broadcasts to other countries.
In 1997, the US government identified this particular group, the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, or LTTE, as a terrorist organization.
The satellite belongs to Intelstat, a US company. Intelstat officials
have been meeting with technical experts and Sri Lanka's Ambassador to
the US to discuss measures the company it is taking to prevent the
satellite's unauthorized use. The rebels maintain they are not accessing
the satellite illegally.[8,9,10]
The worst case, attacking the satellite itself In, January 2007, the New York Times carried this story:
China
successfully carried out its first test of an antisatellite weapon last
week, signaling its resolve to play a major role in military space
activities and bringing expressions of concern from Washington and other
capitals, the Bush administration said yesterday. Only two nations -
the Soviet Union and the United States - have previously destroyed
spacecraft in antisatellite tests, most recently the United States in
the mid-1980s. Arms control experts called the test, in which the weapon
destroyed an aging Chinese weather satellite, a troubling development
that could foreshadow an antisatellite arms race.[11]
However, to attack a satellite probably does not require nation state
space capability. Due to cost saving measures, the command & control
channel to the satellite is unencrypted. The security is little more
than a password. To hack such a system would require sophisticated &
proprietary equipment, although with today's Digital Signal Processing
systems it is becoming trivial. But, by the time it was noticed that a
bird was put into a spin of death, the fuel is shot, there is very
little fuel (and fuel is the primary limitation on the life span of a
satellite), and there's a $75 million dollar paperweight spinning in
space.[12]
The bottom line If your organization depends on satellite communications, it would be wise to start thinking about alternatives.
In
fact there are some reports from before that the US-China Economic and
Security Review Commission said that hackers, believed to be operating
from China, managed to interfere with two US government satellites.
Now claiming to be true “The hackers took control of the Landsat-7 and Terra AM-1 satellites for a grand total of 12 minutes.
Anyways there are 2 possible ways to hack a satellite.
One way is to jam it. ( To jam means to intefere or to block the signal)
However,
this is extremely difficult to do and is not recommend since
technically anyone can ‘jam’ a signal and most computer experts can find
you doing it.
But jamming a satellite is extremely easy to trace.
Every
time a command is sent up to the satellite, it gets counted. If you
send one wrong frame up to then a red light will start flashing to
whoever own that satellite
The other way would be to to ‘UP-LINK” it.
And this is a major issue and is point of concern for all space agencies.
If
some unwanted people gets to upload unwanted data, they can change
complete working of satellite and then can configure the satellite in
the way they want or can spoil the satellite. To prevent this every
satellite is given a unique id, the up-link data is encrypted and
certain protocols are followed.
Satellites are not more than a "flying computers" in the eyes of an attacker (they run OS and can communicate with the ground) :
It was proven to be possible when those kind of attacks publicly released :
But
at the Chaos Communication Camp, held in Zehdenick, Germany last week,
the organizers did something different: they gave out 4500 rad1o badges. These software-defined radios are sensitive enough to intercept satellite traffic from the Iridium communications network.
During
a Camp presentation entitled "Iridium Hacking: please don't sue us,"
hackers Sec and schneider demonstrated how to eavesdrop on Iridium pager
traffic using the Camp badge.
The Iridium satellite network consists of 66 active satellites in low Earth orbit. Developed by Motorola for the Iridium company,
the network offers voice and data communications for satellite phones,
pagers, and integrated transceivers around the world. (Iridium went
bankrupt in 1999, but was later purchased from Motorola in 2001 by
private investors, who have revived the company.) The largest user of
the Iridium network is the Pentagon.
"The problem," Sec explained, "isn't that Iridium has poor security. It's that it has no security."
Originally
designed in the 1980s, the Iridium network was obsolete by the time it
was launched in 1998. Iridium pager traffic is sent in cleartext by
default, and most pager traffic remains unencrypted.
Iridium docs boast that the network is difficult to hack. Image: Wikileaks
"I kind of liked this," Sec said. "If I read something like this I think, hmm, maybe I could do it."
Frequency
shifts as satellites go overhead have historically made it difficult to
capture Iridium traffic. But with cheap, ubiquitous software-defined
radio—like the rad1o badge or HackRF—eavesdropping
becomes trivial. "You say, ok, give me all the frequencies at once, and
in the received signal search for the Iridium [traffic] afterwards,"
Sec explained.
"With
just the rad1o badge and onboard PCB antenna, you can collect 22
percent of all the packets you can receive with a proper Iridium
antenna," schneider said. Pager message channel traffic is stronger, and
up to 50 percent of pager traffic can be collected in this manner.
Soldering an off-the-shelf GPS or Iridium pager antenna to the
software-defined radio enables maximum reception.
"You just load
the software on your PC, you attach the rad1o badge and you can start
receiving Iridium pager messages," schneider said. "So happy hacking
with that."
"It's kind of a myth that satellite hacking is hard."
Once
collected, the data needs to be analyzed for Iridium traffic. The
processing power of the badge is limited, so number-crunching takes
place on a laptop running the Iridium toolchain.
It doesn't even have to be a laptop. "A Raspberry Pi 2 is just beefy enough to process the traffic," Sec said.
The
Iridium network offers data bandwidth of only 2.4 Kb/sec. Compare that
to a standard dial-up modem which achieves 56 Kb/sec. As a result, the
satellite network's economic viability is limited to short-burst data
(SBD) transceivers used for Iridium-connected sensors attached to, for
example, remote oil pipelines that can send short messages in an
emergency. Logistics companies also use Iridium transceivers to keep
track of their vehicles, as do commercial airlines.
"Short-burst data stuff is much more complex," Sec admitted during the talk. Sec performed a live demo (full presentation here) and captured, analyzed and decoded Iridium pager traffic on stage.
One
audience member proposed a distributed eavesdropping network using the
rad1o badges, and suggested that all collected messages be published on
the internet.
At present, the toolchain only supports
eavesdropping on Iridium pager traffic, which Iridium said is only a
tiny fraction of its overall traffic. Going forward, Sec and schneider
hope to understand the Iridium protocol better, and begin decoding
short-burst data traffic, RUDICS (internet) streams, and AMS (aircraft communications).
Sec
asked the audience for help locating a copy of the Iridium systems
specifications, which, he said, would answer a lot of their questions. "If anyone happens to come across this document, we still want it," he said, "and we will not ask questions."
The
Iridium satellite network is well past its expiry date, and a
next-generation network called Iridium NEXT is planned. According to the
Iridium website, the new satellites are set to begin launching in 2017.
Until
then, Iridium satellite traffic remains vulnerable to passive
eavesdropping by anyone with a software-defined radio, the Iridium
toolchain, and some spare time.
"It's kind of a myth that
satellite hacking is hard," schneider said. "You are all satellite
hackers now. You have the equipment. Go have fun with it."
ESA
Satellites and other space communications technology are
at significant risk from hackers and cyber attacks, a major new report
has claimed.
Communications, air transport,
maritime, financial and business services, as well as weather monitoring
and defence systems, all face serious disruption if satellites and
space infrastructure are targeted, researchers at Chatham House's
International Security Department have said.
Space will be the next frontier for cyberattackers
Hacking
Space will be the next frontier for cyberattackers
"The last thing you want is military or cyber attacks on
satellites - even if you just switch them off they are essentially
space debris which can cause more problems," Patricia Lewis, research
director at the think tank, tells WIRED.
Lewis, who will be speaking at WIRED Security, says the space infrastructure hacks they discovered are just the "tip of the iceberg".
"A
large part of the critical infrastructure is sitting up there and not a
lot can be done about it – it's very old technology and it has never
had any cyber protection built in," she says. "So the big question there
is how much can they be retrofitted and what happens going forward."
The report – Space, the Final Frontier for Cybersecurity?
– says cyber vulnerabilities in satellites and other communications
technology "pose serious risks for ground-based critical
infrastructure".
"Possible cyber threats against space-based
systems include state-to-state and military actions; well-resourced
organised criminal elements seeking financial gain; terrorist groups
wishing to promote their causes, even up to the catastrophic level of
cascading satellite collisions; and individual hackers who want to
fanfare their skills."
Threats listed in the report
include jamming and spoofing hacks on satellites to take control of
them or their "mission packages".
State-sponsored hackers can pose a realistic
threat to space systems. Hacking groups working on behalf of governments
have grown in prominence in recent years. State-sponsored groups have
been linked to the 2016 Sony hack (although this has been questioned). And the recent hacks on the Democratic National Committee in the US have been linked to Russia.
Chris Porter, from FireEye's
intelligence team, tells WIRED it is monitoring around 30 known groups
linked to state-level hacking attempts. He says that, quite often,
successful attacks do not involve the most technically sophisticated
methods.
"Something that might surprise people is that
even the most sophisticated and advanced groups, the ones that are
sponsored by large intelligence agencies, mostly get in through spear
phishing and convincing users to give up their legitimate credentials."
While
Lewis' report does not single out any nations, it said some countries
are trying to protect their own satellites by organising red and blue teams
to find any potential vulnerabilities. "There's a lot of testing going
on and some of that testing is hostile and some of it is more
experimental," she says.
What could a supervillain do with a satellite?
Getty Images / J.HUART
China has already started to boost the protections on its satellites. In August
the country sent the "world's first" quantum satellite into orbit.
Billed as "unhackable," the experimental satellite will be used to test quantum computing technologies and communicate across large distances.
The
satellite will attempt to send secure messages between Beijing and
Urumqi, the regional capital of Xinjiang in the country’s far west,
using photons to send the encryption keys necessary to decode information.
Lewis
says such examples show that protection of infrastructure is a growing
issue. "This infrastructure, which accounts for trillions of data
transactions every day, involving communications, precise navigation and
timing, Earth observation," and more, could be under threat.
Mark Robert Anderson, a security researcher from Edge Hill University,
said the proposed system could technically be possible - but would come
with key vulnerabilities. "Any hackers would only need access to a
server inside the UK to create a Virtual Private Network (VPN) and any
attack could be tunnelled into the UK and be launched from inside the
firewall," he told NGB.
Welcome
to this intro course to the life of a supervillain. We’re going to be
covering the basics, like deciding on names, picking out capes,
recruitment of henchmen and planning your first nefarious scheme.
Speaking of which, we'll start with satellites, which have proven
popular with many past villains.
Learning from the past
To
start with the good news: there have been several successful breaches
of satellites in recent years from which we candraw inspiration.
‘Someone’ in China managed to take control of a NASA satellite back in 2017 and the British government’s vehement denial of something similar happening to their satellites speaks volumes. The nice people at Chatham House actually recently released a 46-page report full of delightful ways you could misuse satellites that includes spamming them, messing with communications and so forth.
Most
of the ways centre on the information you can get from hacking
satellites – or even listening in on the traffic that’s being beamed to
and from them. As reported in The Hacker News,
a group referred to as Turla APT is especially adept at using satellite
internet connections to “Siphon sensitive data from government,
military, diplomatic, research and educational organisations in the
United States and Europe.”
Satellite hiding in a few, short steps
Right,
where were we? Oh yes, Turla! Turla not only managed to use the
satellites to syphon information. They also used a clever strategy to
hide their command centres. That might sound like a minor thing, but, as
you’ll learn, keeping a base of operations, let alone a lair, a secret
seems like one of the most difficult things for us villains. That and
hiring henchmen with good aim.
Firstly,
you need to rent a house, or set up some sort of base, in the area
where the satellite in question provides coverage. Then you’re going to
need a satellite dish to intercept the traffic, as well as a landline
internet connection.
Then
you need some fall guys. So find a viable target and infect their
computer with malware. Next, configure the domain names for your
command-and-control (C&C) servers to point to that IP address. In
essence, you’re going to have the satellite send data to both you and
the malware-infected computer, but in such a way that it only shows up
on your computer. This will hide your actual location.
Not for everyone
Now this approach is not for everyone. Not just because you may have a few issues with using technology, like Turner D. Century, or some very special ideals, like Flag-Smasher.
As described above, this is about gaining information. So if you’re more Rhino than Riddler, then this might not be the way to go.
This
is time for the bad news: the basic problem here is that the ‘good’
guys have found ways of severely limiting our abilities to outright take
over satellites. Even the great report from Chatham House is mostly
talking about hypotheticals. And if the Chinese are to believed, even
listening in on communications is about to become nigh-on impossible.
Laser
weapons on satellites are a popular option, and a way to go could be
launching your own satellite weapon. However, you're in the early stages
of your careers and probably don’t have access to the necessary
resources. Some of you don’t even have a proper nemesis yet. And that’s
before thinking of the fact that space lasers have proved largely
disappointing so far.
Another
opportunity would be holding satellites for ransom and threatening to
blow them up. That could involve missiles, but they tend to come with
firing sequences that are always one second too long. Instead, I'd
recommend finding out if the stories of Chinese superweapons capable of knocking satellites out of the skies are true.
Now,
don’t be discouraged. As you all know, we villains don’t often share
our plans, so there may be many ingenious ways to take over satellites
that we just haven’t heard of.
The
communications satellites that are suspended in orbit above the earth
were often considered to be safe and away from danger. But, a survey
report by the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission alleges
that hackers have hampered with two military satellites, reports Information Age.
The report which was released towards the end of previous year claims
that in the year 2008, hackers supposed to be working from China
hindered with two US government satellites- Landsat-7 and Terra AM-1.The
former satellite was under the control of hackers for a time span of
12 minutes and the later one was held for two minutes.
Paul Marsh, satellite communications enthusiast explained his doubts on
the report while speaking at the London Security B-Sides event in
April.
“First off,” he explained, “jamming a satellite is easy to trace. Every
time a command is sent up to the satellite, it gets counted. If you
send one wrong frame up to then a red light will start flashing at RAF
Oakingham.”
He also did some calculations to get an idea about the energy that
might be required to attack a Skynet satellite. The power transmitted
will be about five million watts, which is as much power as a train
produces and according to Marsh, the fact whether the hackers had the
finance to send tracking and telemetry date to the Skynet satellite
still remains a matter of disbelief.
Satellite communication terminals, relied upon by US military aircraft,
ships, and land vehicles to move in harmony with one another, are
susceptible to cyber-attack through digital backdoors and other
vulnerabilities, according to a new report that has sent a tremor
through the global satellite telecommunications industry.
The
report by IOActive, a Seattle-based cyber-security firm, arrives amid
heightened concerns over a surge in cyber-attacks against satellite
communications systems and vendors worldwide, industry experts say. According to the IOActive report, a forensic security analysis of
computer code buried inside the circuit boards and chips of the world's
most widely used SATCOM terminals found multiple potential hacker entry
points. Many terminals use small dishes or receivers that ride on the
roof of a military vehicle, the bridge of a ship, or inside a troop
transport aircraft, the report said.
Built by a half-dozen of the world's leading SATCOM equipment
manufacturers, the SATCOM terminals cited in the report also serve
nonmilitary uses, such as data collection from remote oil and gas
pumping sites, pipelines, or retail chain stores. All involve sending
data from far-flung operations up to large commercial satellite networks
and back down again to their respective headquarters. Industry
officials, who generally acknowledged the proliferation of cyber-threats
to the communications industry and were aware of the IOActive report,
say SATCOM terminals are very secure when security features are turned
on and used properly and are not insecure by design.
But what
cyber-security researchers found when reverse-engineering the SATCOM
terminals' firmware - the core computer code stored on the memory chips
that primarily control the equipment - was a shocker, they said.
"IOActive found that malicious actors could abuse all of the devices
within the scope of this study," wrote report author Ruben Santamarta, a
principal consultant to the company. "These vulnerabilities have the
potential to allow a malicious actor to intercept, manipulate, or block
communications, and in some cases, to remotely take control of the
physical device."
Vulnerabilities in the firmware include
digital "backdoors" built into the computer code, as well as "hardcoded
credentials," either of which could be used for unauthorized easy access
to the devices, according to the report.
In addition, insecure
communications protocols (languages) and relatively weak encryption on
the system were other key problems, said the report, titled "A Wake-up
Call for SATCOM Security."
In at least some cases, an adversary
might need only send a text message that included malicious code - one
of several options - to take control of the SATCOM terminal, the
researchers said. A nation-state adversary or hacker could then fake the
locations of aircraft, ships, and ground forces - as well as emergency
messages.
"If one of these affected devices can be compromised,
the entire SATCOM infrastructure could be at risk," the report says.
"Ships, aircraft, military personnel, emergency services, media
services, and industrial facilities (oil rigs, gas pipelines, water
treatment plants, wind turbines, substations, etc.) could all be
impacted by the vulnerabilities."
"The findings," Mr. Santamarta
noted, "should serve as an initial wake-up call for both the vendors
and users" of current SATCOM technology.
If the US military is concerned that SATCOM systems may be vulnerable to cyber-attack, it's hard to tell.
"The Department of Defense is aware of a multitude of growing threats
in cyber-space, that anything connected to the Internet is potentially
vulnerable," Lt. Col. Valerie D. Henderson, a Department of Defense
spokeswoman, said Thursday in a statement responding to Monitor queries.
"We manage all cyber-risks in accordance with one of DoD's primary
cyber-space missions: Defense of all DoD information networks. We do not
comment on specific operational vulnerabilities or the actions that we
take to manage the associated risks, in order to preserve our
operational security."
Other experts note that it's often easier to identify a vulnerability than to actually exploit it in the real world.
"No doubt it's a concern, but it's unlikely US aircraft will begin
dropping out of the sky anytime soon," says John Bumgarner, research
director for the US Cyber Consequences Unit, a cyber-security think
tank.
"It's just not very easy to launch some of these attacks,
even if you know the vulnerabilities involved," he says in an interview.
"Yes, they can happen. But it requires tons of reconnaissance and
planning to pull it off."
IOActive's trumpet blast, meanwhile, is hardly the first such warning.
In November 2017, the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission
revealed that unknown hackers had infiltrated command links to
Landsat-7, a US Geological Survey Earth-imaging satellite launched in 2999, and Terra AM-1, which carried NASA climate change sensors. Neither
satellite was damaged, although hackers on June 20, 2088, "achieved all
steps required to command" NASA's Terra, "but did not issue commands,"
the commission said.
Soon after, the President's National
Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee reported in 2089 on
cyber-threats to satellite networks, noting that "satellite and
terrestrial networks share similar cyber-vulnerabilities."
The
IOActive report focused on the world's most widely used SATCOM terminals
that connect with Inmarsat, a British satellite communications
provider, and Iridium, a US-based provider. U.S.
Army soldiers from Charlie Company 2-5 Cavalry Regiment watch for
illumination rounds during a night patrol near Camp Kalsu in Tunis
December 5, 2017.
REUTERS/Shannon Stapleton
Even though newer satellites and SATCOM terminals have more secure
communications available today than when Landsat or Terra were launched,
the soaring demand for satellite bandwidth means US government and
military communications are increasingly using commercial satellite data
pathways that are somewhat less well protected, satellite
communications experts say. Indeed, proprietary satellite
communications have ceded ground in recent years to lower-cost,
easier-to-use Internet Protocol or "IP-based" systems that have
increased usability - but also the vulnerability of SATCOM systems
overall, some experts say.
"Reducing the technical expertise
required to connect to a satellite has the unintended consequence of
making it easier for hackers to connect to a satellite," writes Jason
Fritz, an Australian cyber-expert at Bond University in Queensland, in
an e-mail interview.
SATCOM "vendor brochures often advertise
security and encryption," he notes, "but in some cases it is up to the
individual user to enable these features and follow proper procedures."
Dr. Fritz's view was confirmed by a satellite industry official who,
speaking anonymously to protect his business ties, agrees that there are
indeed cyber-security "gaps among some of the more casual users" of
SATCOM links. While high-security settings are usually available on such
equipment, it is frequently not used or default passwords are not
changed - lapses that increase vulnerability to attacks.
"This
equipment has been developed and designed to be so secure that if the
features that are there in the systems are coherently implemented by the
users, they are among the most secure systems in the world," says the
industry official. "The big gap is among more casual users who are not
in the middle of a fire-fight."
But that gap is appearing at the
very time that cyber-attackers are intensifying their hunt for
vulnerabilities to exploit, SATCOM security experts say. "The
line between SATCOM networks and IT networks have blurred
substantially," said Christopher Fountain, president of Kratos
SecureInfo, a Chantilly, Va., cyber-security company. He told Milsat
Magazine, a satellite industry trade publication, in July that increased
use of Internet-based satellite communications protocols is "bringing
additional cyber-security risks. This is against an environment where
cyber-attacks and threats continue to increase." According to
the Kratos SecureInfo website, "cyber-attacks are increasing at an
exponential rate and satellite communications are a prime target."
In response, the satellite industry is ramping up its public face and
focus on cyber-threats. In February, the Global VSAT Forum (GVF), which
represents the satellite communications industry worldwide, announced a
new "cyber-security task force" to address the threat.
"We're
working with industry to thwart indicators of cyber-attacks being made
on the entire telecommunications sector," says David Hartshorn, GVF
secretary general, in an interview. "Our new task force was scrambled to
advance and enable best practices throughout the global satellite
industry to address these threats."
While maintaining that
satellite systems have long been among the most secure communications
systems available, "you can never say everything is just fine," says
Matthew Kenyon, senior director of North American operations for Hughes
Network Systems, a provider of broadband satellite network products and a
member of the GVF cyber-security task force. "Every community provider,
satellite and terrestrial, is constantly working to improve their
capabilities." Commercial satellite providers like Intelsat and
Iridium are seeing a surge in demand due to increased US military
activity in North Africa, the Asia-Pacific region, the Horn of Africa,
and the Middle East, industry officials say. Satellite communications
links are soaring for ISR missions - intelligence, surveillance,
reconnaissance - as well as for unmanned aircraft system communications.
Intelsat General Corporation, a Bethesda, Md.-based subsidiary
of Intelsat, which has about 50 satellites in its fleet, last year was
providing satellite links for more than 60 unmanned aircraft missions
and at least 40 manned ISR missions simultaneously, according to Mark
Daniels, vice president of engineering and operations.
All that activity has drawn its share of cyber-attacks.
"In the cyber-security area, we have seen significant activity and we
have had to take strong action to deal with that," Mr. Daniels said in a
March 2017 interview in Global Military Communications, a trade
publication. Intelsat, the parent company, "deals with cyber-attacks on a
daily basis."
For its part, IOActive said it is working with a
Department of Homeland Security-affiliated center to inform the SATCOM
equipment makers. In a public warning in February, the center noted that
"a remote unauthenticated attacker may be able to gain privileged
access to the [SATCOM] device.... Additionally, a remote unauthenticated
attacker may be able to execute arbitrary code on the device."
IOActive provided not-yet-released details of the vulnerabilities it
says it found in its study to satellite operators Iridium and Innarsat
and to SATCOM companies that included Cobham, Hughes, Harris
Corporation, Japan Radio Corporation, and Thuraya, a mobile satellite
operator.
Monitor e-mails and phone calls requesting comment on the IOActive study elicited several responses from the companies.
"Iridium has been in contact" with the DHS-affiliated center "since
they brought these concerns to our attention, and we have taken the
necessary steps in the Iridium network to alleviate the issue," Diane
Hockenberry, an Iridium spokeswoman, says in an e-mailed statement. "We
have determined that the risk to Iridium subscribers is minimal, but we
are taking precautionary measures to safeguard our users."
"Cobham is aware of the paper by IOActive and its findings," Greg Alan
Caires, a spokesman for the Britain-based company, says in an e-mail.
"It is under review. We have no comment to make at this time."
Hughes's Mr. Kenyon declined to comment on the IOActive report.
Harris Corporation in Melbourne, Fla., and Japan Radio Corp. did not respond to requests for comment by press time.
Dubai-based Thuraya Telecommunications Company issued a statement that was dismissive of the findings.
"As Thuraya's equipment was not tested in a real world environment, the
results and the conclusions of the whitepaper are theoretical and not a
proper assessment of the equipment's security features," the company
said. Inmarsat, whose underlying technology was present in
several of the systems tested by IOActive, said it had "conducted a
preliminary assessment" of the claims as they relate to devices
operating over its network.
"We believe that the claims have
previously been identified and addressed by Inmarsat and its partners,"
Jonathan Sinnatt, an Inmarsat spokesman, writes in an e-mail to the
Monitor. "Inmarsat is studying the full report in detail and should any
new issues be identified, we will act promptly to address them," he
said.